THE IRANIAN ENIGMA: THE NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION – WHAT NEXT?
There is one word that sums up the discussion, in Israel and around the world, on the Iranian issue: uncertainty. What exactly is happening in the Iranian nuclear crisis, and where is it leading us? Winston Churchill’s phrase describing Soviet Russia is well suited to our understanding of the Iranian situation: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”. We will nevertheless try to analyse the situation and to present the known facts, what is not known, and what lies in the realm of estimates, beliefs and emotions. To separate as far as is possible true signals within an ocean of background noise on the central question of the Iranian nuclear crisis: is it possible to reach a new nuclear agreement that would limit and prevent Iran’s route to nuclear weapons?
Last week’s IAEA Board of Governors meeting and the monitoring reports presented by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi are a good starting point to clarify and analyse the facts. In his opening statement, Rafael Grossi emphasized the IAEA’s central concern: the dramatic acceleration in the stockpile of higher enriched uranium to 60% enriched uranium in the three months since the election of Donald Trump to the US Presidency in November 2024. The increase of 92 kilograms enriched uranium stockpile to 275 kilograms. In theory with this, one could create a number of nuclear bombs, not just one. But no less concerning is the rate of monthly enrichment of 35 kilograms of uranium enriched to a high level (as opposed to a monthly rate of 6-9 kilograms in the past). This could theoretically make possible the production of fissile material for a bomb each month.
Against the backdrop of the dramatic acceleration of uranium to a high level, the IAEA Director General emphasized the urgent need for intervention by global high level political and diplomatic senior officials to create a framework for a new nuclear agreement. Time is running out. Although he is in close contact with the Trump administration, Grossi expressed disappointment and concern that to date a special envoy for the Iranian nuclear issue has not been appointed.
The E3 (the three European states who were party to the JCPOA – the UK, France and Germany) and the US issued a joint strongly worded statement at the IAEA Board meeting: Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the IAEA safeguards and to abide by its obligations in accordance with the safeguard agreements raises especial concern. This concern has deepened following the declarations by senior Iranian officials regarding the Iranian technical capability to build nuclear weapons, and calls for Iran to change its nuclear doctrine (in the direction of nuclear weapons). The US and the E3 stated that their patience is not limitless and that it is time to prepare for a declaration that Iran is in non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement, and by implication of the NPT.
The position taken by the EU and the European powers following the IAEA reports represents an unprecedented escalation in the field of diplomacy. It would be a step with far reaching operational implications. A declaration of non-compliance, together with a comprehensive report on past and present violations of the nuclear program that the IAEA is supposed to publish in the coming months would return the Iranian nuclear file to the UN Security Council in the framework of UN Charter, Chapter 7: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace. Iran sees decisions made in the framework of Chapter 7 that would enable military intervention, as in the case of the US invasion of Iraq during the time of Saddam Hussein, as a total rupture and an intolerable situation. This could lead to a stepping up of escalation on Iran’s side, to the point of withdrawal from the NPT and expulsion of the IAEA monitors.
On the other hand, in the face of these dramatic developments pointing to an escalation leading to a military solution, President Trump is issuing contradictory messages daily. Each side hears what they want in his Oracle of Delphi like declarations. Trump’s belligerent declarations that the US will not allow Iran nuclear weapons. That he will not hesitate to exercise the military option to attack Iran’s nuclear sites if an agreement is not reached. And on the other hand, his repeated assertions that a diplomatic solution and signature of a new nuclear agreement would be preferable to a military attack.
And pending a diplomatic solution, the President ceremoniously signed at the White House a Presidential Memorandum to apply “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran. The Presidential Memorandum outlines the American comprehensive policy on the nuclear issues. The Presidential document states that US policy is that “Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles”. The Iranian nuclear program, including uranium enrichment, plutonium separation, and intercontinental nuclear missile capability pose an “existential threat” to the US and to all the countries in the world. According to the Memorandum, by concealing undeclared nuclear sites Iran is already in breach of its NPT obligations. Therefore, US national security interests oblige the US to impose maximum pressure on Iran in order to “end its nuclear threat, curtail its ballistic missile program”.
From an in depth reading of the Presidential Memorandum, we can fairly quickly understand why Iran refuses to enter into negotiations with Trump. It is not because of the economic sanctions which Iran has learned to live with for decades. The military-strategic articles detailed in the Presidential Memorandum were perceived by the Iranian leadership as an unacceptable outline for the total dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program. From the Iranian point of view, this is the “Libyan model” route for the dismantling of a nuclear program as was enforced by the US and the UK on Muammar Gaddafi. It is also a repeat of the Pompeo doctrine – zero centrifuges, zero enriched uranium. The removal of the conceptual framework that made possible the JCPOA in the Obama period: authorization to enrich uranium under tight IAEA monitoring, a ban on the route to developing nuclear weapons.
But in spite of the gloomy picture of the accelerated uranium enrichment in the IAEA reports, to the point of a threshold state, and the military references in the Presidential Memorandum, it would appear that there is a readiness and possibility to enter into negotiations. Beyond the declarations of intent by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian when he took up office, we can assume from the declarations by official spokesmen in recent days, (for example, by the Iranian Mission to the UN) that there is something to discuss. That is, if the discussions take place in the context of military parameters and features of nuclear weapons as was the case for the JCPOA, and not the complete dismantlement of the nuclear program.
Here we are on less firm factual ground. This is where Putin and Russia enter into the picture. Trump sent a personal letter to the Iranian leadership (whose contents have not yet been published) in which he expressed willingness to negotiate, along with threats of a military option. In parallel, according to Bloomberg, Trump discussed in a telephone call to Russian President Putin the possibility of Russian mediation to advance negotiations for a nuclear agreement. We do not know the details regarding the Russian mediation mission or if there are indeed direct or indirect negotiations taking place between the US and Iran. We also do not know if there are backchannels taking place in Oman between the US and Iranian representatives such as those that paved the way for the JCPOA during the Obama presidency. A backchannel is by definition clandestine, and we only learn about it in retrospect. Be that as it may, it is worth noting that Russia is one of the three nuclear superpowers, together with the US and the UK, who hold responsibility for the NPT. Russia played a central role in the negotiations and implementation of the JCPOA during the Obama presidency. Russian has a strategic interest in preventing the emergence of a nuclear weapon state not far from its borders and those of the former Soviet Union.
Surprisingly, this week, China also joined the diplomatic efforts to calm the nuclear tensions. We all remember the role that China played in the past in reaching detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In a three party meeting in Beijing with senior Iranian and Russian representatives, the participants emphasized the need to prevent escalation through diplomacy without threats of unilateral sanctions. Russia and China stood by Iran against Trump’s maximal pressure, and declared that Iran is in “full compliance” with its obligations under the NPT. It is possible that the pronounced emphasis on and volume devoted to the NPT in the joint statement, defined as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, are a signal to Iran not to escalate the situation by withdrawing from the NPT.
In the meantime in Israel. The discussion of a possible new nuclear agreement is of less interest to Prime Minister Netanyahu. From the precedent of the previous JCPOA agreement, we know that Netanyahu is opposed to any nuclear agreement with Iran. There have been increasing calls in Israel to initiate a preventive war against the Iranian nuclear sites as I analysed in my article “The Trump Effect: Escalation in The Israeli Discourse on a Preventive War against Iran” . An almost uniform narrative from politicians and leading commentators with access to good sources gives a sense of urgency and a need to take advantage of a window of opportunity that cannot be missed. Talks of planning for an independent preventive war or one in cooperation with the US in the near future. Former Ambassador Dan Shapiro, who also played roles in the Biden administration, summarized in a strategic affairs conference at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv (25 February 2025): there is a prospect of an Israeli attack on Iran “possibly already this fall” with US assistance.
Nevertheless, when we hear repeated declarations in Israel about preparations for an imminent Israeli attack on Iran, we should remember: as along as there is no US green light for an Israeli preventive war, and as long as the Trump administration has not supplied the weapons essential for bombing fortified underground nuclear sites (giant bunker penetrating bombs as well as the aircraft necessary for this task) the feasibility of such an undertaking remains uncertain.
The motif of uncertainty accompanies my analysis of the balance of the dangers of escalation and the chances for a new nuclear agreement. It is not just an Iranian enigma. The uncertainty also relates to an unpredictable US President. Uncertainty and unplanned results of an entanglement in a preventive war. Also, a counter reaction of uranium enrichment to a 90% level, and Iranian withdrawal from the NPT. And the reopening of the nuclear weaponisation program that was closed in 2003. And as a direct result, cracks in and the undermining of the NPT. And the opening of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. This would be a new regional and global reality, full of dangers for Israel’s national security. The state that was the main beneficiary of the JCPOA which blocked the route to a nuclear weapons Iran, and paradoxically, the one that derived protection from the NPT to which it was not a party.
Shemuel Meir is an independent Israeli strategic analyst. Graduate of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a former IDF and Tel Aviv University researcher.