The Mysterious Silence: Why has the Iranian nuclear issue disappeared from Israel’s strategic discourse?

Over the past decade, voices of war have provided an unrelenting background to Israel’s Iranian discourse led by Prime Minister Netanyahu and echoed by military and political commentators. These voices usually focused on “an Iranian bomb within weeks” and on scenarios for a preventative war against Iran’s nuclear sites. But recently, there has been a “truce” on the Israeli Iranian nuclear front.

This is something new, and we should ask ourselves what has happened and why. In the last public appearance recorded on the subject (last May’s Herzliya Conference), Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi warned of Iranian progress in enriching uranium “more than ever before” as well as worrying signs of “negative developments” - which he did not detail, but apparently refer to the 60% enrichment of uranium - which are liable to push Israel to act. Since then, there has been an unusual lull in Israel’s belligerent rhetoric on the Iranian nuclear discourse.

All of this has been happening in parallel to reports in the international media, which received widespread coverage in Israel, on US-Iranian contacts and “understandings” regarding a temporary nuclear agreement “less for less”: a freezing of Iran’s uranium enrichment program in exchange for an easing for financial sanctions. To date, we have not seen the text of any such “understandings” agreement, and official US spokespeople have denied that there are any ongoing negotiations for a nuclear agreement with Iran. A battle fog has descended to which can be added the enigma of the strange affair of the removal of Special Presidential Envoy Rob Malley.

The picture is even more complicated since we do not know what exactly is meant by a “freeze”. A freeze of the existing situation of 60% uranium enrichment level while maintaining the existing stock (114 kg) or a roll back of the existing program of 60% enrichment thereby preventing a legitimization  of high enrichment? We will only receive an answer to this question when the IAEA Board meets in September 2023. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s report for the September session will also let us know whether there has been any progress on the two undeclared sites that still require an Iranian answer. Although these two undeclared nuclear weapons sites were part of the nuclear weapons program that was closed in 2003, the failure by the Iranians to provide a satisfactory answer is the main bone of contention preventing the renewal of a nuclear agreement between Iran and the Superpowers.

Prime Minister Netanyahu opposes any agreement or diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. In his public pronouncements, he still proudly notes that it was he who pushed President Trump to withdraw from the JCPOA nuclear agreement which led to the eventual collapse of the agreement. Even though it is clear to all that this was a colossal strategic mistake. The 2015 nuclear agreement blocked Iran’s path to nuclear weapons, whether uranium or plutonium, and imposed on Iran the most intrusive monitoring and verification system in nuclear weapons history

It is clear from Netanyahu’s repeated statements that he is opposed to the June 2023 US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) report according to which Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, and that ”Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities that would be necessary to produce a testable nuclear device”. This is the assessment of the US National Intelligence assessment has remained unchanged since 2007. It is worth noting that the Head of Israeli Military Intelligence - who is responsible for the National Estimate in the Israeli system not the Mossad - shares the assessment of the US Director of National Intelligence.

Why is this important? Because from the US point of view, only the existence of a “weapons group” and a weaponization plan could legitimize an attack on Iranian nuclear sites. This is the reason that US Presidents who are bound by the DNI assessments have opposed and blocked Israeli preventive war since before the JCPOA. Ehud Barak learned this when as Minister of Defense, he tried to implement attack scenarios against Iranian nuclear sites. Detailed analysis of the US veto can be found in my review of Ehud Barak’s autobiography which interestingly was published only in English.

A new nuclear agreement if signed, or even a temporary “understandings” agreement will strengthen international norms that make attacks on nuclear sites illegitimate, and will push back Israeli plans to attack. The Biden administration has apparently made clear to Netanyahu that he must refrain from attacking nuclear sites on Iranian soil. Since June 2021, no attacks have been noted. This is in contrast to the continuous green light that the US has given for attacks of Iranian targets on Syrian soil. In this context, the frequent visits to Israel, every few weeks, by CENTCOM commander General Michael Kurilla are intended to project US deterrence vis a vis Iran, and to keep an eye on Israel and prevent Israeli “surprise” attacks on nuclear sites in Iranian territory.

In the meantime, in recent months there has been a dramatic development in Israel which has taken center place on the public agenda, and has dramatic military-strategic consequences: Netanyahu’s attempt at a coup intended to dismantle the judicial and democratic system that has existed in Israel since its founding 75 years ago. Netanyahu’s attempt has met with a massive wave of huge demonstrations and protests by those determined to protect Israeli democracy. The wave of protests penetrated the army and the senior command, in particular the air force. According to leaks from documents cautioning Netanyahu sent to him by the Chief of Staff and the Head of Military Intelligence, this has affected military operational readiness.

It is still unclear how the protests and demonstration against the judicial coup will influence operational plans regarding Iran; particularly how it will influence Israeli decision makers and military planners whose planning tends not to take into account international norms against preventive war.  Instead, it seems that they continue to prefer to rely on the concept of “freedom of action”, and on the “Begin doctrine” regarding the elimination of nuclear sites. This in spite of the fact that the lessons learned from the attack on a single nuclear reactor in its early stages (Osirak) in Iraq, and on a single reactor in Syria imported from North Korea, are not relevant  to the extensive complex of the Iranian nuclear program. A military attack on Iran would be far more complicated. We are talking about a protected complex, fortified underground, and dispersed in many sites throughout Iran at a distance of 1,500 km from the Israeli border.This will pose a difficulty for the attacking air force. This is not just an overnight sortie as in the Begin doctrine. Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi hinted during a lecture at the Herzliya Conference that the military campaign will not be easy for the IDF which is built to fight in its “backyard” close to home. What the Chief of Staff did not mention is that US approval and advance coordination would be a necessary condition. Without US agreement, there will be no independent Israeli attack on Iran.

Shemuel Meir is an independent Israeli strategic analyst