The First Iran-Israel War, The Nuclear Dimension and Other Unresolved Issues
In April 2024, the Iran-Israel war broke out. On the night of 13 April, Israel for the first time came under an unprecedented attack when a massive barrage of missiles was launched from Iran towards Israeli targets: 110 medium range ballistic missiles (1,500-1,800 kilometres) on one military target, an air base in the south of the country, and around 200 slower cruise missiles and drones. The Israeli air defense system of missiles against missiles in close cooperation with the US, British and French air forces, repelled the attack and downed the Iranian missiles. Only seven ballistic missiles penetrated Israeli territory.
According to Israeli media reports, that night the security cabinet considered an immediate wide range retaliatory attack against Iran. From the Israeli point of view, it was impossible to ignore the Iranian military escalation and its crossing of red lines. A phone call from President Biden to Prime Minister Netanyahu led to the postponement of the planned Israeli retaliatory attack. Israel responded a few days later with a limited aerial attack on Iranian territory that was intended to send a strategic message: an attack on the air defense system near the Natanz central nuclear facility for uranium enrichment; a marking of the goals for the next round.
The intense rate of events and exchange of military blows between Israel and Iran brought the sides to the brink of a wide-ranging regional war. Worse than that. For the first time, there was a danger of a military confrontation in the Middle East in the context of two rivals with a nuclear link. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the element of a nuclear capability demonstration (attributed to Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan) against Egypt and Syria was one sided.
In the days after the exchange of blows there was a temporary calm and efforts to de-escalate. This was apparently a result of intense political and diplomatic efforts on the part of the Biden administration to stop the drift towards war. This included secret backchannels with Iran (via the Swiss Embassy in Teheran) and a combination of messages of deterrence and a show of military force in the Persian Gulf. But it would be a mistake to think the situation returned to normal. The direct missile attack from Iranian territory – no longer the secret shadow wars – created a dangerous and fragile new situation. Even at this early stage, it is important to examine from the Israeli angle, the issues that were drowned out by the sounds of war. And to analyse the failures that led the sides to the edge of war. To try to draw initial lessons to prevent a descent into war in the future.
How Did It All Begin, and The Dangers of War Through Miscalculation
My mentor for understanding of outbreak of war, and how war begins is the British historian A.J.P. Taylor. In addition to the discussion of the profound causes – the deep issues and changes in the balances of power in international relations – Taylor emphasizes the need to focus on the identification of the last cause, the reason which in his view gives the final push to war. In our case, the killing of the two senior Revolutionary Guard officers in the compound of the Iranian Embassy in Damascus at the beginning of April 2024. In the view of the Israeli decision makers and military intelligence, the killings were more of the same. It was an operational-tactical exploitation of an opportunity as has been the case many times in the past. Israel did not attach much importance to the fact that this was not just another building in Damascus, but a building adjacent to the Embassy, part of the diplomatic compound and a symbol of Iranian sovereignty. The decision makers and military intelligence assessed that the Iranian reaction would be minor as in the past. This intelligence-political failure led to the Iranian leadership’s unprecedented fierce reaction. To the extent that Iran abandoned its traditional approach of relative restraint and “strategic patience”. Instead of an indirect military response through proxies, we received on the night of 13 April a direct war between Iran and Israel. This was the type of war as a result of miscalculation against which everyone warns. A war that arises out of a system of erroneous considerations that are likely to be repeated in the unstable situation between Iran and Israel, states which speak only through the language of signals (which are sometimes obscure and not grasped by the other side) and who lack formal channels of communication.
Cracks in the Security Doctrine
In recent decades, Israel’ security doctrine has been based on an indisputable credo: Israel can defend itself by itself in any situation and against any threat. The 7 October surprise Hamas attack, the continuing war that followed, and the barrage of Iranian missiles – all these threw Israel off balance. Not only did Israel urgently require massive US aid in defending its territory and conveying deterrence against Iran, the intense and tension filled events created a conceptual shock.
The Israeli security and deterrence doctrine has been based since the time of Prime Minister Ben Gurion on the principle of maximum freedom of action as expressed in the reliance on preventive and pre-emptive strike planning. Israel tends not to distinguish between the two concepts. But in the international arena, a preventive strike against a possible threat – one which is not certain in an unknown future – is not acceptable. This is in contrast to a pre-emptive strike against a certain threat in an immediate timeframe which is legitimate in the eyes of the international community. But on the night of the missiles, Israel did not act in accordance with its basic security doctrine. It did not react with a pre-emptive strike in the face of the certain threat of the launching of Iranian ballistic missiles at Israel which it was known would occur within hours. This is a state of affairs that demands an analytical clarification. Most specifically regarding the future of the deterrence doctrine. The same elusive concept that did not prevent the Iranian missile attack.
Deterrence and a Defense Treaty with the US
The security and deterrence doctrine will have to undergo changes and be updated. It is too early to assess how the Iranian missile attack will influence the new paradigm. It is possible that the result will be a reliance on a formal defense treaty with the US. Immediately after the 7 October surprise Hamas attack, Israeli deterrence received an unprecedented momentum. President Biden sent a clear message to Iran that at the edge of Israeli deterrence stands US military power. At once, the “special relations” with the US jumped almost to the status of a defense treaty. But the new strategic step of “almost a defense treaty” will not be sufficient in the face of the new array of threats or against an assertive Iran which as a result of the collapse of the JCPOA has become a threshold state with latent nuclear capability. A formal defense treaty on the model of the South Korea and Japan could be an appropriate and desirable strategic answer for Israel. Only a formal defense treaty could remove all doubts and ambiguity on the question of what the US will do if Iran attacks Israel. Especially regarding the possibility that a massive missile attack from Iranian territory is not a one-time event. It is an event that could be repeated.
Nevertheless, there are a number of strategic weak spots (beyond the internal US legal complications) that would make it difficult for the US to propose a formal defense treaty to Israel like the one that is currently in advanced stages of discussion with Saudi Arabia.
The first weak point: a formal defense treaty is intended to defend territory from a massive military attack. Which territory are we talking about in Israel’s case? The US would find it difficult to sign a defense treaty with a state that does not have defined borders, territory that includes settlements in the West Bank that are illegal under international law. Peace treaties that would define Israel’s borders and the domain of its sovereignty are necessary conditions for a defense treaty with the US.
The second weak spot is in the nuclear field. The US would be willing to sign a formal mutual defense treaty only with a state which is a member of the NPT. And only with a “non-nuclear weapons state” (NNWS) according to the Treaty definition. Israel is one of only four countries in the world that is not a signatory to the NPT.
Furthermore, a defense treaty that is intended to provide the ultimate guarantee for Israel’s defense and a psychological feeling of security for its citizens has an additional latent function for the US. To moderate and restrain Israel from unilateral steps. To be certain that Netanyahu does not intend to exploit the war escalation against Iran in order to implement the “Begin doctrine” of a preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. This could drag the US into attacking the sites against its own will. An old Netanyahu dream and a longstanding US fear.
The Nuclear Issue
A final note on the situation of increasing uncertainty. A formal defense treaty with the US would require a dramatic conceptual change to Israel’s nuclear doctrine. Israel is likely to be asked to give up its strategy of deterrence and nuclear ambiguity, which I analysed in my previous article in the context of the 1969 Nixon-Golda Understandings. To abandon the unique nuclear status that granted it an American exemption for decades from signing the NPT. A new world which Israel has never had to think about.
Shemuel Meir is an independent Israeli strategic analyst. Graduate of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a former IDF and Tel Aviv University researcher.